SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners.In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE- Tullis v. Teial, 182 N.J. Super.
553, 442 A.2d 1039 (App. Div. 1982) ......................
943
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SEwICE OF PRocEss-Local 617, International Brotherhood oJ Teamsters v. Hudson Bergen Trucking.
Co., 182 N.J. Super. 16, 440 A.2d 18 (App. Div. 1981) ....... 944
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-State v. Powell,
182 N.J. Super. 386, 440 A.2d 1377 (Law Div. 1982) ........
945

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH

AND SEizuRE-State

in re

R.B.C., 183 N.J. Super. 121, 443 A.2d 271 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1981) .............................
.................
947
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-S
cAH AND SEizURE-State v.
Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 443 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1982) .. 948
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-Persons v. Bergmann, 182 N.J.
Super. 476, 442 A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1982) .................
951
ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTROL-ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-

Crema v. New Jersey Department of EnvironmentalProtection,
182 N.J. Super. 445, 442 A.2d 630 (App. Div. 1982) .........
953
HEALTH INSURANCE-Starks v. Hospital Service Plan, 182
N.J. Super. 342, 440 A.2d 1353 (App. Div. 1981) ............
956

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BUDGETARY

RESTRICTIONS-

City of Passaicv. Local Finance Board, 88 N.J. 293, 441 A.2d
736 (1982) .............................................. 958
WATER AND WATER COURSES-Velsicol Chemical Corp. v.
Department of Environmental Protection, 182 N.J. Super. 575,
442 A.2d 1051 (App. Div. 1982) ...........................
960

942

1982]

943

SURVEY

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-EvIDENCE
BILLS DENIED UNDER

OF COLLECTIBLE MEDICAL

PIP INADMISSIBLE IN SUIT FOR DAMAGES

BROUGHT AGAINST THUD

PAnTY--Tullis v. Teial, 182 N.J. Super.

553, 442 A.2d 1039 (App. Div. 1982).
Mrs. Henrietta Tullis submitted medical bills to her insurance
company under no fault coverage for injuries incurred as a result of an
automobile accident. Although the carrier denied payment for some
of the bills, Mrs. Tullis was permitted to introduce evidence of her
unreimbursed medical expenses at trial in a suit for personal injuries
which she brought against the owner and the driver of the other
automobile. 182 N.J. Super. at 556, 442 A.2d at 1041.
Following a verdict and judgment for Mrs. Tullis, the defendants
filed an appeal. The appellate court remanded the matter for a new
trial, id. at 561, 442 A.2d at 1043, holding that "evidence of medical
bills incurred by a person injured in an automobile accident for which
personal injury protection benefits (PIP) may be collectible as a matter of law" is inadmissible in a suit for damages brought against a
third party where payment under PIP was denied "on the ground that
the medical procedures for which the bills were rendered were for
conditions unrelated to the accident." Id. at 555, 442 A.2d at 1040.

Noting that N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:6A-4(a) (West Cum. Supp.

1981-1982) requires no-fault policies to provide for "payment of all
reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of personal injury
sustained in an automobile accident," id., the appellate court concluded that the expenses were the same as those which may be recovered from a defendant in a damage action. 182 N.J. Super. at 558, 442
A.2d at 1041.

The court next construed N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:6A-12 (West

1973), which bars the "admission of evidence of amounts collectible or
paid pursuant to PIP coverage," as manifesting the legislative intent
"that the money need not [have been] paid for proof of the bill to be
barred." 182 N.J. Super. at 558, 442 A.2d at 1041. According to the
Tullis court, such a result furthered the purpose of no-fault legislation
by limiting a potential plaintiffs choice of remedies to an efficient and
inexpensive system of reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses.
Thus, in the event that her insurance company had wrongfully withheld payment of medical expenses, Mrs. Tullis was required "to pursue her claim for PIP benefits directly against her carrier and not in a
third party action." Id. at 560, 442 A.2d at 1042. Conversely, if the
insurance company was justified in denying payment, evidence of
these medical expenses was irrelevant and could have been held inadmissible at the damage trial. Id. at 561, 442 A.2d at 1043.
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The Tullis decision is significant because it clarifies the interplay
between N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-12
with respect to the common law principle that "[c]ompensation for
medical expenses can be recovered from a defendant in a damage
action only if related to the injury for which damages are sought." 182
N.J. Super. at 557-58, 442 A.2d at 1041. The appellate court's decision strengthens New Jersey's commitment to lower insurance costs
and to greater convenience for the public.
L.A.H.

CIVIL PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-AGENTS AUTHORIZED To
RwCEIvE SERVICE ON BEHALF OF CORPORATION-Local 617, Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hudson Bergen Trucking
Co., 182 N.J. Super. 16, 440 A.2d 18 (App. Div. 1981).
Hudson Bergen Trucking Company and a local union of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters agreed to submit a labor
dispute concerning a trucking company employee to arbitration. 182
N.J. Super. at 18, 440 A.2d at 19. The trucking company authorized a
New York attorney to represent it in the arbitration. The attorney
executed a standard form issued by the New Jersey State Board of
Mediation indicating the agreement to submit the specific controversy
to binding arbitration. Id. at 20, 440 A.2d at 21. An arbitration
award was issued and the union filed a complaint seeking confirmation of the award. The union served process on the trucking company's attorney in his New York office. Id. at 18, 440 A.2d at 19. An
order of confirmation was entered against the company by default.
The trucking company then moved to vacate the order on the theory
that since the attorney was not a person authorized to receive service
on its behalf under N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1), the union had failed to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over the company. The trial court
denied the motion to vacate and the company appealed. 182 N.J.
Super. at 18, 440 A.2d at 19.
The appellate court reversed in a per curiam opinion rejecting
the trial court's reasoning that the company, by authorizing the New
York attorney to act for it in the arbitration proceeding, had held out
the attorney as an authorized agent to accept service on its behalf. The
court indicated that although there were no New Jersey cases defining
persons authorized to receive service on behalf of a corporation under
N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1), it was not without guidance to construe the
rule. Since the New Jersey rule is almost identical to the federal rule
governing service of process, the court reasoned that it could consider
both federal case law and treatises interpreting the federal service of
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process rule. 182 N.J. Super. at 19, 440 A.2d at 20. According to

Moorl's

FEDERAL PRACTICE,

even though the agent's authority to re-

ceive service of process may be implied from the circumstances, it still
must be demonstrated that the agent was specifically authorized to
receive service. 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.22[1], at 4-187 (2d ed. 1980). As
pointed out by Wright and Miller, there must be a showing that the
defendant intended to vest the agent with such authority. 4 C.
WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1097, at

372 (1969). Furthermore, federal courts have consistently required
either an express agreement or clear evidence that the defendant
intended the agent to accept service on its behalf. 182 N.J. Super. at
20, 440 A.2d at 20. Based on this authority, the court concluded that
since the only evidence regarding the scope of the attorney's authority
was the standard submission agreement executed by the attorney,
which the court found contained neither an express nor implied grant
of agency, the union therefore failed to meet the burden of proof
necessary to deem the New York attorney a person authorized to
receive service under N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1). 182 N.J. Super. at 21,
440 A.2d at 21.
Since the ramifications of this decision will be far reaching, the
court rightfully construed the New Jersey service of process rule in a
restrictive manner. Adopting a less restrictive agency standard would
permit overzealous plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over defendant
corporations through the guise of an agency relationship regardless of
whether or not the defendant intended the agent to receive service on
its behalf.
M.M.R.

CRIMINAL

LAW-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBLITY-PERSON INDICTED FOR

RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND GUILTY OF THEFT-

State v. Powell, 182 N.J. Super. 386, 440 A.2d 1377 (Law Div.
1982).
Victor Disanzo was trying to start his 1979 Plymouth on Washington Street in Newark when a passer-by offered his services. The
stranger, after having checked the engine, got into the car, started it
and drove away. The car was found several days later during a
routine check. The driver, William Powell, was indicted on one count
for "the crime of theft by purposely receiving [stolen] property." 182
N.J. Super. at 387, 440 A.2d at 1378. At trial, the owner identified
Powell as the person who drove off with the car. Powell testified that
the car was loaned to him by his look-alike brother. The credibility of
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Powell's testimony was rejected by Judge McGann of the law division,
criminal section. The judge then found Powell guilty of theft. Id. at
388, 440 A.2d at 1378.
On Powell's motion for a new trial, Judge McGann faced the
issue whether a one-count indictment for receiving a stolen vehicle
precluded a verdict of theft. The issue arose because a "receiver" and a
"thief" were mutually exclusive charges under prior New Jersey law.
See State v. Bell, 105 N.J. Super. 238, 251 A.2d 768 (App. Div. 1969),
rev'd, 55 N.J. 239, 260 A.2d 849 (1970). But under the New Jersey
Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to 98-2 (West
Supp. 1981), the legislature abrogated this "nice distinction," 182 N.J.
Super. at 388, 440 A.2d at 1378, by including within the statutory
definition of "theft" the classification of theft by receiving stolen

property. See N.J.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 2C:20-7. That the legislature in-

tended to absorb receiving stolen property into the concept of theft is
made clear by the legislature's statement that "a charge of theft may
be supported by evidence that it was committed in any matter that
would be theft under this chapter." Id. § 2C:20-2(a). Moreover,
under this "unification of the theft concept," evidence of having
received stolen property is sufficient to prove theft since it establishes
"the requisite thieving state of mind." 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW
JERSEY CPMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION,

at 232.

Noting that the legislature can freely define criminal activity in
any way it chooses as long as due process rights are protected, the
court found "no constitutional infirmity in this legislative scheme."
182 N.J. Super. at 389, 440 A.2d at 1379. Judge McGann then ruled
that Powell's indictment provided him with sufficient detail regarding
the case against him and put him on notice that his culpability would
be based on his being either a taker or a receiver of stolen property.
Furthermore, Powell was protected against the surprise of having to
refute evidence that he was a taker rather than a receiver by the
statutory mandate of fairness, which ensures adequate discovery, the
granting of a bill of particulars, and "other appropriate relief where
the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice
or by surprise." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2(a). Judge McGann therefore denied Powell's motion for a new trial. 182 N.J. Super. at 389,
440 A.2d at 1379.
Judge McGann's construction of the new Criminal Code is well
reasoned. The Code has achieved an appropriate balance: it affords
the proper procedural protections to criminal defendants to ensure
that they will not be surprised with proofs addressing unanticipated
areas of culpability; yet it denies to criminal defendants the ability to
avoid conviction merely by means of technical legal maneuvering.
J.R.D.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH

AND SEIZURE-INDICATION OF
TIME OF OBSERVED OR REPORTED ILLEGALITY NECESSARY IN AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING SEARCH WAIwANT-State in re R.B.C., 183 N.J.

Super. 121, 443 A.2d 271 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1981).
On April 29, 1981, the municipal judge in Millville issued a
warrant authorizing a search of the named juvenile's home. 183 N.J.
Super. at 125, 443 A.2d at 273. The warrant was based on a Millville
police officer's affidavit which detailed the officer's knowledge concerning alleged drug dealings of the juvenile. The affidavit included
information gathered from personal surveillance and an informant's
report, but failed to specify the time or dates of the officer's, or the
informant's observations. Id. at 126, 443 A.2d at 273.
Evidence seized during the subsequent search included drugs and
drug paraphernalia. Id. at 124, 443 A.2d at 272. The juvenile defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, one count of possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, and one count of growing marijuana.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized. He argued
that the warrant was fatally defective due to the failure of the underlying affidavit to specify the dates or times of the informant's alleged
observation of illegal activities or of the officer's surveillance to corroborate the informant's tip. Id. at 126, 443 A.2d at 273. In the
absence of dates and times, the defendant contended, the issuing
judge had insufficient information from which to ascertain if the
claimed illegality was continuing at the time he issued the warrant.
Id. at 127, 443 A.2d at 274. The affidavit, therefore, failed to establish the requisite probable cause.
The juvenile and domestic relations court agreed with the defendant and held that the affidavit did not provide an adequate basis
for believing that the illegal behavior was continuing at the time the
warrant was issued. Id. at 135, 443 A.2d at 278. Consequently, the
warrant was not premised on probable cause and the evidence seized
was inadmissible.
The state argued that the affidavit presented facts sufficient to
indicate continuing illegal activity. Id. at 127, 443 A.2d at 274.
According to the prosecution, a lapse of time between the observation
of the incidents and the grant of the warrant is acceptable if the
underlying offense can be characterized as continuous. Id. at 133, 443
A.2d at 277. The court dismissed this contention absent facts to support it.
While reaffirming judicial preference for warrant searches over
warrantless searches, Judge Gruccio applied the accepted principle
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that the court's review of the warrant is limited to "the four corners of
the affidavit." Id. at 129, 433 A.2d at 275. Reviewing the affidavit,
the court found that it only implied illegal activities " 'at some prior
time.' " Id. at 131, 443 A.2d at 276 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 113, 281 A.2d 897, 899 (1971)). This implication
was too indefinite on which to base probable cause of continuing
illegality.
The court approved two means by which the municipal judge
may find the requisite definiteness to avoid later warrant invalidation.
State and federal courts have accepted words such as "recently,"
"during," or "on many occasions." Id. at 132, 433 A.2d at 277.
Similarly, some courts have found the use of the present tense sufficient to rebut alleged time uncertainty. Neither of these possibilities
was applicable in the present case. The decision concluded that "the
choice between the dangers of suppressing controlled dangerous substances and the dangers of their misuse if they are freely available is,
ultimately, a choice the Fourth Amendment makes for us." Id. at 136,
433 A.2d at 279.
The real value of State in re R.B.C. rests in its practical advice
that a supporting affidavit contain, if not a specific time and date,
language sufficiently indicative of the fact that the alleged criminal
behavior was continuing " 'up to or about the time the warrant was
issued.' " Id. at 131, 433 A.2d at 276 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Shaw, 444 Pa. at 114, 281 A.2d at 899). This case, therefore, helps one
to comprehend the nebulous definition of probable cause as "something more than an unsupported suspicion, but less than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 128, 433 A.2d at 274. The decision is
direct and affirms the fourth amendment requirement of specificity in
search warrants. It represents further evidence of New Jersey's liberal
judicial tendency to safeguard a suspect's constitutional rights within
the context of balancing competing state and private interests.
L.M.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEAcH

AND

SEIZURE-WARANTLESS

SEARCH OF PASSENGER COMPARTMENT AND CONTAINERS FOUND
THEREIN UPHELD WHERE CUSTODIAL ARREST MADE-State v. Kear-

ney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 443 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1982).
On October 21, 1977, New Jersey State Trooper Edward Hess
observed a car with no inspection sticker in a turnpike service area.
The driver produced his registration as requested, but had to open the
trunk to get his license. Hess saw in the trunk an open case holding
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what he recognized as methadone containers. He then spotted the
defendant, who appeared extremely nervous, in the front passenger
seat and instructed him to exit the vehicle. 183 N.J. Super. at 16, 443
A.2d at 215. As Hess attempted to perform a protective pat down
search, he felt a bulge in the defendant's chest pocket. When the
defendant resisted, Hess reached into the pocket and extracted two
glassine packets of white powder, whereupon the defendant was arrested and his jacket in the car searched, yielding additional contraband. The driver and another passenger were then arrested and the
entire car, including the trunk and its contents, was searched, producing further illegal substances. Id. at 16-17, 443 A.2d at 215.
Defendant's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court,
which found the pat down reasonable since there was probable cause
to believe that crime was afoot. The court also ruled that the arrest
after discovery of the contraband was proper; the search of defendant's jacket was therefore valid as incident to arrest. As for the other
contraband seized, the "plain view" exception justified seizure of the
contents of the open case in the trunk, while the contents of a closed
container in the case were seized pursuant to a search incident to
arrest. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methadone in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-20(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 19811982) and the counts for possession of other illegal substances were
dismissed. 183 N.J. Super. at 17, 443 A.2d at 215-16.
On appeal, the court used a "totality of the circumstances" standard to dispose of defendant's claim that the pat down was not based
on reasonable cause to believe that he was armed and presently dangerous. Relying principally on State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 231 A.2d
353 (1967), the court found that Hess, an experienced officer, previously involved with methadone identification and arrests, 183 N.J.
Super. at 18, 443 A.2d at 216, reasonably concluded that defendant's
nervousness stemmed from the contraband in the trunk and that flight
or attack was imminent. With regard to the contention that the
seizure from the shirt pocket exceeded the constitutional bounds of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), since no possible weapon was
detected, the court held that a police officer is not required " 'to
identify by species the object of his concern,' " 183 N.J. Super. at 18,
443 A.2d at 216 (quoting State v. Ransom, 169 N.J. Super. 511, 52122, 405 A.2d 411, 416-17 (App. Div. 1979)), provided he has reasonable cause to fear for his safety. Given defendant's resistance, Hess
could not ascertain the presence of a weapon; hence, the intrusion into
the shirt pocket was warranted.
With regard to the seizure of evidence from the jacket in the car,
defendant contended that his arrest and the search of his jacket as
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incident to the arrest were illegal fruits of the invalid intrusion into his
shirt pocket. Alternatively, the search exceeded the area under his
immediate control and was, therefore, not incident to his arrest. 183
N.J. Super. at 19, 443 A.2d at 217. The court disposed of the first
claim by finding that the intrusion into defendant's pocket was
proper. Next, the court relied on New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981) to dispose of the second claim. In Belton, the United States
Supreme Court upheld as incident to the custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile the search of the entire passenger compartment of a car, including closed containers found therein. Id. at 2865.
Acknowledging that the New Jersey Supreme Court had not yet considered Belton, the appellate division nonetheless followed Belton and
found the search of defendant's jacket valid. 183 N.J. Super. at 20,
443 A.2d at 217.
Defendant's challenge of the seizure of the trunk's contents was
met by the state's argument of lack of standing to raise such an issue.
Recognizing that federal cases base standing on a "reasonable expectation of privacy," the court noted New Jersey's refusal in State v.
Alston, 87 N.J. 531, 436 A.2d 81 (1980)* to adopt federal standards,
instead recognizing standing upon a showing of a possessory, participatory, or privacy interest. Id. at 547, 436 A.2d at 89. Given that
Alston retained the automatic standing rule for offenses in which
possession at the time of seizure is an essential element of the crime,
id. at 548-49, 436 A.2d at 90, defendant did indeed have standing to
challenge the seizure of the contents of the trunk, he being charged
with a possessory offense. 183 N.J. Super. at 21, 443 A.2d at 218.
In response to defendant's contention that the search of the case
in the trunk was neither based on probable cause nor the product of
an inadvertent viewing as required by Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 433 (1971), the court held that all of the requirements of
Coolidge had been met. First, the contents of the trunk were brought
into "plain view" when the driver voluntarily opened the trunk pursuant to a lawful request to produce his license and registration; second,
Hess' viewing was inadvertent because he had no pre-existing knowledge of the contents of the trunk; and third, based on his experience,
Hess recognized the incriminating nature of the evidence. 183 N.J.
Super. at 22-23, 443 A.2d at 218.
Finally, with regard to the search of the open case, the court held
that because there was probable cause to seize the open case and its
contents at the time of the arrest, the case's contents could be identi* This opinion was withdrawn by the Supreme Court of New Jersey and republished at 88
N.J. 211 (1981).
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fied as incident to the arrest. Relying on the widely accepted principle
that when property is lawfully in police custody an item-by-item
inventory of its contents may be performed at the station, the court
concluded that the search of the closed container in the open case was
not so extensive as to offend federal or state warrant provisions.
Accordingly, the entire chain of searches was upheld. Id. at 23, 443
A.2d at 219.
The appellate court's adoption of the holding in New York v.
Belton substantially limits the rights of criminal defendants in New
Jersey. This is a significant departure from the approach in State v.
Alston in which the New Jersey Supreme Court exercised its right to
rely on state constitutional provisions to extend to state criminal defendants greater protection than that afforded under the federal Constitution, for example in the area of standing. Such expansion of areas
subject to warrantless searches, coupled with the extension of the
scope of inventory searches from searches at the station to searches at
the scene, will doubtless be the subject of further judicial consideration.
M.S.O.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR- SUCCESSFUL BIDDER PURCHASING VOID
SHEIUFF'S

DEED

CAN RECOVER FROM JUDGMENT

CREDITOR WHO

v. Bergmann, 182 N.J.
Super. 476, 442 A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1982).
INDUCED THE EXECUTION SALE-Persons

James Persons, the plaintiff, was the successful bidder at a sheriff's sale of real property. The property had been owned by defendant's wife, Victoria Eller, and Soya Michalewsky, as tenants in common. When the defendant and Victoria were divorced, the defendant
received a judgment against his wife for $4,270. Before their divorce
was finalized, however, the property had been conveyed to Victoria's
son for a consideration of one dollar. In order to satisfy the judgment
against his wife, the defendant submitted an affidavit to the sheriff
stating that his wife's property had been fraudulently conveyed for the
purpose of defeating a levy on the property. As a result the sheriff
conducted an execution sale, the proceeds of which were paid to the
defendant in satisfaction of his judgment. Months prior to the execution sale, however, Victoria's son had conveyed the property back to
Soya Michalewsky, who in turn sold it to Charming and Eileen Eng
for $25,000. 182 N.J. Super. at 479, 442 A.2d at 648.
The plaintiff sued to quiet title against the Engs and, alternatively, for the full amount of his bid and court costs from defendant as
a judgment creditor. The chancery division dismissed the claim
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against the Engs because the plaintiff was not in possession of the
property, a prerequisite to an action for quieting title. The second
count of plaintiff's action was transferred to the law division where
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the Engs and his wife's son
did not have good title, that the plaintiff did, and furthermore, that
his lien as a judgment creditor was superior to the Engs' interest
because his former wife had fraudulently conveyed the property. Id.
at 479, 442 A.2d at 649.
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that all parties
conceded that the Engs were bona fide purchasers for value, but the
court rejected defendant's contention that the Engs' tide was inferior
to his as a judgment creditor. Id. at 479, 442 A.2d at 649. Relying on
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-15 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), the court
noted that a creditor usually has authority to levy execution on any
property fraudulently conveyed except when a purchaser has taken
without knowledge that the conveyance was fraudulent. Furthermore, title secured from a fraudulent grantee by a bona fide purchaser
is superior to that of a judgment creditor. 182 N.J. Super. at 480, 442
A.2d at 649.
The most important issue decided by the court was to sustain the
lower court's award to the plaintiff of a money judgment in the
amount of his bid and court costs. Observing that authority outside of
New Jersey recognizes the right of a successful bidder to restitution or
reimbursement when the sheriff's deed is null and void due to a
judgment debtor's lack of title, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's decision and iterated that the plaintiff in the instant case also
had such a right. Id. at 481, 442 A.2d at 649.
Outside authorities, however, are split as to whether this right is
against judgment debtors or judgment creditors. The prevailing view
relies on the doctrine of caveat emptor and a "policy consideration
that favors the permanency and stability of judicial sales" to deny the
successful bidder the right to recovery from a judgment creditor who
completely lacks tide to property. The minority view is that a remedy
is available to a purchaser at a sheriff's sale against judgment creditors. The Persons court adopted the latter view and found that despite
the fact that there was no claim that the defendant fraudulently
misinformed the sheriff as to his wife's title in the property, the effect
of the payment of the bid to the defendant was to "unjustly enrich
him" because he satisfied his judgment against his former wife with
funds from the sale of property she did not own. Under an equity
theory, the court awarded the plaintiff recovery against the party who
had induced the execution sale, the judgment creditor. Id. at 482, 442
A.2d at 650.
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The Persons court embraced the general rule that a successful
bidder who has purchased a void sheriff's deed has a right to restitution or reimbursement. By providing a remedy against judgment
creditors as opposed to judgment debtors, the court is forcing creditors
to litigate their claims only against judgment debtors, and to subrogate such claims in favor of a successful bidder. The ruling has the
effect of placing on judgment creditors the burden of ensuring that
fraudulently conveyed property which is to be sold at a sheriff's sale
has not been purchased by a bona fide purchaser. Judgment creditors
may thus be more likely to make the requisite good faith efforts to
locate and levy on the personal property of a judgment debtor before
seeking an execution sale on real property.
M.A.V.

ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTROL-ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-No

Ex-

PRESS OR IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION FOR ISSUANCE OF CONCEPTUAL
PERMIT To

CONSTRUCr PURSUANT TO STATE COASTAL PROTECTION

LAw-Crema v. New Jersey Department of EnvironmentalProtection, 182 N.J. Super. 445, 442 A.2d 630 (App. Div. 1982).
On October 9, 1979, respondent, Historic Smithville Development Company (HSDC), applied to the Division of Coastal Resources
(DCR), a unit of the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
for a permit to construct a large scale development in the Great BayMullica River estuary area pursuant to the Coastal Area Facility
Review Act (CAFRA), N.J. STAT. ANN.

§

13:19-1 (West 1979).

The HSDC plan contemplated a substantial development including a large hotel, several thousand living units, considerable commercial and office space, and an anticipated population of 20,000 people.
182 N.J. Super. at 448, 442 A.2d at 631. The proposed development
site was regarded as one of the few remaining areas in southeastern
New Jersey capable of supporting commercial shelfishing. It was also

located near a national wildlife refuge where the delicate environmental balance caused the state to designate it as a low-growth area.
Id. at 449, 442 A.2d at 631. In April of 1980, the DCR issued a
conditional permit to HSDC "conceptually" approving the project,
but prohibiting actual construction pending compliance with statutory standards. Id. at 448, 442 4.2d at 631. According to the DCR's
decision, conceptual approval did not constitute permission to begin
construction; rather, it merely approved the idea of a large scale
residential development at the proposed site. Id. at 449-50, 442 A.2d
at 632.
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The decision expressly stated that no obligation to approve any
parcel of the development attached to the conditional permit, and no
implicit approval of future construction permit applications arose
from the grant of conceptual approval. Furthermore, the DCR decision reserved the right to restrict the project's size and to order remedial steps should significant adverse impacts arise. Id. at 450, 442
A.2d at 632.
Plaintiffs, commercial shellfishermen and environmental groups,
challenged the issuance of the conceptual permit and appealed the
DCR's decision to the DEP. Id. at 447, 442 A.2d at 631. That agency,
recognizing the policy implications of the appeal, referred it to the
Coastal Area Review Board (CARB). Id. at 448-49, 442 A.2d at 631.
The CARB affirmed the DCR's determination under N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:19-13 (West 1979). Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought review in
the appellate division. 182 N.J. Super. at 447, 442 A.2d at 631.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the CAFRA statutory
scheme does not authorize conceptual approval. Additionally, they
contended that issuance of the HSDC permit violated the DEP's regulation designating the area as low-growth, and contravened "the
State's coastal growth management strategy" as set forth in CAFRA
and accompanying regulations. Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the
approval was not based on the necessary factual findings to safeguard
"th[e] environmentally sensitive area." In response, the state argued
that "there was inherent protection in the permit's condition that no
concrete steps ... be taken without" demonstrating to the DEP that
"no adverse impact.., will ... result." Id. at 448, 442 A.2d at 631.
It further contended that conceptual approval was an appropriate
administrative action, with factual and legal support, in light of the
magnitude of the project.
Writing for the appellate division, Judge Antell examined the
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions to evaluate plaintiffs'
assertion that no legal authority existed for the decision. He observed

that N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 13:19-5 (West 1979) authorized the DEP to

issue permits only for project construction. 182 N.J. Super. at 450, 442
A.2d at 632. While a conditionally approved construction permit is
allowed under CAFRA, Judge Antell commented that "a permit issued on condition that no construction take place," as in the present
case, "is a contradiction in terms." Id. at 450, 442 A.2d at 633.
Examining the CAFRA permit regulations, it is clear that the word
"permit" is defined and operatively used in terms of construction.
Concluding his review of the statutory framework, Judge Antell stated
that under CAFRA the Commissioner may only issue a permit upon
specific findings that the project is environmentally suitable and safe.
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Against this background, the appellate division held that the
conditional permit, as the DCR had developed it, lacked an express or
implied statutory authorization. The appellate panel explained that
conceptual approval is restricted to "informal pre-application nonbinding conference[s]" with the EPA, and does not constitute an
agency decision. Id. at 451, 442 A.2d at 633.
Having established the absence of statutory authority for conceptual approval, the Crema court reviewed the DCR's factfinding required under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-10 (West 1979). It first distinguished the character of the permit in the present case from one
sustained in Public Interest Research Group v. State, 152 N.J. Super.
191, 377 A.2d 915 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 538 (1977), in
which CAFRA issued a permit to a utility company to construct a
nuclear power plant. The permit was issued subject to the condition
that the company monitor salt emissions from the plant and report the
levels to the DEP which could adopt remedial measures if required.
Compliance with this condition was necessary to obtain permission to
operate the power plant. Id. at 208-10, 377 A.2d at 924-25. That
permit was upheld, Judge Antell asserted, because there was sufficient
evidence supporting the DEP's finding that the CAFRA criteria were
met. 182 N.J. Super. at 451, 442 A.2d at 633. In the present case,
however, a permit was granted on the condition that statutory requirements would be satisfied in the future. Although the DCR's
decision indicated that each component of the project would be separately reviewed and approved as the review process progressed, the
initial "conceptual" approval would likely become more firmly entrenched. Since the permit approved items of major importance, in
time conceptual approval may be viewed as an implicit "partial
weighing of the statutory criteria," thus precluding independent review of later related applications. Id. at 452, 442 A.2d at 634.
The appellate division concluded that deficiencies in the DCR's
factfinding precluded affirmance of the HSDC's permit. Notably, the
DCR's decision suggested that the expected growth in Atlantic City
generated by the casino industry was the basis for selection of the
HSDC site. The court noted, however, that HSDC did not consider
alternative locations to this environmentally sensitive area as required
by the statute. Id. at 453, 442 A.2d at 634. It also rejected the DEP's
contention that HSDC's permit could be justified under N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, § 7E-8.11 (1979), which provides for conditional approval
of "large scale residential developments," because of the agency's
failure to make required findings that would bring HSDC within the
rule. 182 N.J. Super. at 453-54, 442 A.2d at 634-35.
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Perhaps the real significance of the Crema decision is the triumph
of environmental interests over powerful casino interests. Also important is that a comparison of Crema and Public Interest Research
Group highlights a theory that the DEP was trying to present in the
instant case. Apparently, the DEP was attempting to extend the con-

ditional permit concept approved in Public Interest Research Group,
with respect to the highly technical, rapidly changing area of nuclear
power, see 152 N.J. Super. at 211, 377 A.2d at 927, to the area of
large-scale residential developments. This is evident from its characterization of the conceptual permit as a reasonable, legal method to
contend with "the unique demands placed on the administrative system by the large-scale project." 182 N.J. Super. at 448, 442 A.2d at
631. The DEP's failed attempt to bring the HSDC project within the
large scale plan residential rule, id. at 453, 442 A.2d at 634, also
supports this view.
The Crema court did not recognize the DEP's theory because the
agency granted the permit without making the specific findings necessary to satisfy the statutory criteria. Hence, through the conceptual
nature of the permit, indefiniteness was introduced into the foundation of the permit, rather than into additional, though important,
matters as in Public Interest Research Group. If sufficient evidence
were produced to satisfy the statutory criteria, conditional, but not
conceptual, approval of a permit for construction of a large-scale
residential development could be sustained.
For now the rule is clear as to conceptual approval in the Crema
fact situation: "The fragility of the environment is so extreme, the
consequences of miscalculation so great, and the legislative intent to
preserve the environment so clearly stated," that "a strong statutory
and regulatory presumption" arises "disfavoring a permit application
for construction in regions with such sensitive characteristics without
carefully documented findings as to the nonacceptability of all reasonable alternatives." 182 N.J. Super. at 453, 442 A.2d at 634.
A.L.M.

INSURANCE-INSURANCE CARRIER REQuuE To ASSUME
PmIMARY COVERAGE OBLIGATION DESPITE COB PROVISION LITERALLY RENDERING IT SECONDARY- Starks v. Hospital Service Plan,

HEALTH

182 N.J. Super. 342, 440 A.2d 1353 (App. Div. 1981).
A union furnished its employees with a group reimbursement

plan (Welfare Fund Plan), whereby members and their dependents
were reimbursed for medical and hospital service payments for which
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no other coverage was available. 182 N.J. Super. at 347-48, 440 A.2d
at 1356. The Welfare Fund Plan provided that payment would be
made only where no other insurance coverage was available or where
other coverage would pay less than that available under the Welfare
Fund Plan. Id. at 348, 440 A.2d at 1356. In short, the Welfare Fund
Plan was a health cost reimbursement plan of last resort. Id. at 350,
440 A.2d at 1357.
Some of the union employees covered by the Welfare Fund Plan
were also eligible as dependents for coverage under their spouses' Blue
Cross/Blue Shield employer group plan. Id. at 348, 440 A.2d at 1356.
However, the contract included a coordination of benefits provision
(COB) which was intended to avoid duplicate insurance coverage in
cases in which the beneficiary enjoyed protection under another plan.
Id. at 345-48, 440 A.2d at 1354-57. The apparent intent of the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield COB clause was to make its coverage secondary to
equivalent coverage in any other plan unless such plans also contained
a similar COB provision. Id. at 347, 440 A.2d at 1356.
The conflict in the instant case arose when Blue Cross/Blue Shield
refused to pay or reimburse individual employees for medical expenses, claiming that the Welfare Fund Plan was primarily responsible. The employees, the Union, and the Welfare Fund joined as
plaintiffs against Blue Cross/Blue Shield to secure a court declaration
that the insurance carrier was primarily obligated for medical expenses incurred by Welfare Fund members who were also dependents
under their spouses' Blue Cross/Blue Shield group employment plan.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, but the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
reversed. Id. at 349, 440 A.2d at 1357.
The appellate division rejected the lower court's literal reading of
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield COB clause and instead considered the
original purpose of the clause. Id. at 350, 440 A.2d at 1357-58. The
court recognized that while the purpose of a COB provision is to
prevent double recovery, it explained that carriers frequently disagree
over their respective responsibilities. Id. at 351, 440 A.2d at 1358. To
resolve the dispute the court examined the contracts to establish which
responsibilities each carrier intended to assume, whether the carrier's
intentions were compatible, and most importantly, whether those
intentions conformed to public policy.
Because the case was one of first impression, the court examined
analogous principles in motor vehicle and other insurance areas. The
court noted that those principles suggested that if one medical plan
expresses an intention to assume "an obligation prior to or subsequent
to the other [Plan]," those intentions should be enforced. Since the
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Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan intended to assume secondary responsibility for the individual plaintiffs, and the Welfare Fund's coverage was
only intended to be tertiary, the court held that "the only rational
result is to require the secondary coverage to pay first and the tertiary
coverage to pay second." Id. at 353-54, 440 A.2d at 1360. The Welfare Fund Plan was intended to provide only additional coverage over
and above any "excess" coverage already available to the claimant.
Id. at 354, 440 A.2d at 1360. It was never intended to be a primary
obligor. Id. at 352, 440 A.2d at 1358.
Furthermore, the court determined that such intentions were
consistent with public policy because the Plan affected only the obligations between the carriers rather than the beneficiaries' ultimate
recovery. Id. at 354, 440 A.2d at 1360. Accordingly, the appellate
division reversed the trial court's decision which would have required
the Welfare Fund to assume primary responsibility. Id. at 349, 440
A.2d at 1357.
Although the court's decision is unique in the health insurance
field, id. at 343, 440 A.2d at 1354, it is not surprising. The opinion not
only relied upon established insurance law principles, but it embodied
the very result which the National Association of Insurance Commissioners recommended in such cases. Id. at 355, 440 A.2d at 1360. The
appellate division's action, moreover, should alert trial courts to a
policy favoring flexible construction of COB provisions to effectuate
their underlying purposes.
L.G.H.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-BUDGETARY
REsTRICIONS-MUNICIPALITY MAY APPROVE EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS EXCEEDING
STATUTORY BUDGET "CAPS" THOUGH EXIGENCY WAS NOT "SUDDEN

of Passaic v. Local Finance Board,
88 N.J. 293, 441 A.2d 736 (1982).
AND UNANTICIPATED,"-City

All New Jersey municipalities are subject to the state's statutory
budgetary restrictions commonly known as "caps" which limit spending increases in fiscal budgets to five percent over the prior year's
expenditures. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-45.1 to 45.5 (West 1980). In
certain circumstances the local governments may make emergency
appropriations to meet pressing public needs. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40A:4-46 (West 1980).
The City of Passaic [hereinafter the City] initially prepared a
budget for the calendar year 1980 which fully complied with the
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provisions of the cap laws. Included in the budget was a $80,967
reserve to provide for anticipated salary increases for municipal employees. The City created this reserve despite the fact that: (1) the
amount represented only a one percent increase over the preceding
year's wages; and (2) negotiations with the employees' bargaining
units had not yet been concluded. 88 N.J. at 295, 441 A.2d at 737.
The employment contracts ultimately signed by the City guaranteed aggregate salary increases greatly exceeding the $80,967 reserve.
In fact, when combined with other emergency appropriations
adopted for general municipal purposes, the total budget deficit
amounted to $565,400. As required by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-49
(West 1980), the City requested the Director of the Division of Local
Government [hereinafter the Director] to approve the emergency
funding. 88 N.J. at 296, 441 A.2d at 737.
The Director rejected the City's request and the City appealed to
the Local Finance Board as it is empowered to do by N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27BB-10(4) (West 1955). The Board held a hearing at which it
disapproved the requested emergency funding because the appropriations were not "due to sudden, unanticipated or unexpected events
that occurred subsequent to the adoption of the City's 1980 budget."
88 N.J. at 296, 441 A.2d at 737.
The City then sought relief from the appellate division and that
court ordered the Director to approve the City's emergency appropriation request subject to the condition that the City submit an acceptable plan for financing the emergency expenditures. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted the Director's petition for certification.
The supreme court found that the legislature had enacted the
emergency appropriation statutes to allow municipalities to provide
emergency funding for underappropriated items as well as unforeseeable circumstances. Id. at 298-99, 441 A.2d at 737. In so holding the
court expressly refused to accept the proposition that emergency appropriations are permissible only in circumstances of "sudden, unexpected, or unanticipated need." Id. at 298, 441 A.2d at 738.
The court decided that the propriety of emergency appropriations should be determined not by the foreseeability of the exigency
but by the credibility of the municipality's effort to make adequate
provisions in the budget. Id. at 300, 441 A.2d at 739. The court
qualified this ruling, however, by noting that their approval of the
City's emergency appropriation should not be construed as sanctioning dilatory or other tactics which result in "gross underappropriations."
Moreover, the court readily admitted that the City's inclusion of
a one percent increase in salary allocations might not be viewed as a
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good faith effort to structure a reasonable budget. Accordingly, the
court concluded its opinion by warning that municipalities are now
"'on notice as to the scope of their emergency powers," id. at 303, 441
A.2d at 741, and will be expected to present a more convincing
demonstration of good faith budget appropriations in order to secure
authorization for emergency appropriations. Nevertheless, the court
recognized that disclosure of anticipated salary increases significantly
undermines a municipality's bargaining position and recommended
that corrective legislation be adopted so that municipalities do not
have to use emergency funding to provide competitive wages for local
employees. Id. at 302 n.3, 441 A.2d at 741 n.3.
The court's analysis of the state cap laws is commendable for its
pragmatic approach to this pervasive problem. Because of the five
percent spending increase imposed on New Jersey municipalities, it is
frequently difficult for them to prepare budgets which adequately
provide for all contingencies. It is therefore imperative that local
governments be authorized to make emergency appropriations in excess of the statutory guidelines whenever exigent circumstances so
warrant without regard to the suddenness of the emergency situation.
J.A.L.

WATER AND WATER COURSES-BIOLOGICAL DELINEATION MAPPING METHOD UPON WHICH STATE BASED CLAIM OF TITLE TO TIDEFLOwED RIPARIAN LANDS HELD INSUFFICIENT To SUSTAIN STATE'S

BURDEN OF PROOF IN

QuIET TITLE AcTION- Velsicol Chemical

Corp. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
182 N.J. Super. 575, 442 A.2d 1051 (App. Div. 1982).
Velsicol Chemical Corporation (Velsicol) owned a tract of land
along Berry's Creek in the Hackensack Meadowlands to which the
State of New Jersey claimed title as tide-flowed riparian land. Nearby
property owned by John Clause and Oak Point Excavation and Foundation Corporation (Clause) was similarly claimed. In separate
actions to quiet title to these lands, judgments were entered in favor of
the landowners. The state appealed from the adverse judgments and
the appeals were consolidated. In addition, Velsicol cross-appealed
from a judgment quieting title in the state to a tidal creek within the
Velsicol tract. 182 N.J. Super. at 578, 442 A.2d at 1052.
The state's claim to the lands was based upon the biological
delineation method of tideland mapping which the supreme court
approved in City of Newark v. NaturalResource Council Department
of EnvironmentalProtection, 82 N.J. 530, 414 A.2d 1304 (1980). The
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issue confronting the Velsicol court was the evidentiary value of these
maps in quiet title litigation, an issue which the Newark court expressly left unaddressed. 182 N.J. Super. at 579, 442 A.2d at 1053.
At trial before Judge Petrella, the state introduced the maps into
evidence to support its contention that the disputed area was riparian
land. Id. at 580, 442 A.2d at 1053. It offered no further evidence to
show that its mapping technique based on biological delineation of the
mean high tide flow "was prima facie accurate, [thus] shifting the
burden of proof to the property owners of record to rebut it." Id. at
582, 442 A.2d at 1054. The trial court, however, concluded that the
state had failed to prove that the disputed lands were, in fact, tideflowed. Id. at 581, 442 A.2d at 1054.
The appellate division, in a decision written by Judge Furman,
agreed. It held that the state had failed to establish a proper foundation for its interpretation of the mapping data. The state offered no
testimony concerning the application and analysis of the scientific
data to these particular parcels of land. Absent such testimony, it was
held that the state had failed to sustain its burden of proof. The court
followed the rule set forth in O'Neill v. State Highway Department,
50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967), that the "party challenging the
existing physical scene bears the burden of proof" in tidelands litigation. 182 N.J. Super. at 581-82, 442 A.2d at 1054.
On the matter of Velsicol's cross-appeal, the appellate division
was confronted with a novel issue in tidelands litigation. Velsicol
asserted title in and to a tidal creek which it had relocated from one
portion of its tract to the creek's present location. Its claim of ownership was based upon "general principles that artifical changes [of
water courses] are without effect in determining tideland status." Id.
at 582, 442 A.2d at 1054. The state alleged that the bed of the creek
fell within an area which biological analysis determined to be tideflowed.
In reversing the trial court's judgment quieting title in the state,
Judge Furman again rejected the state's reliance on its mapping technique as lacking the proper foundation to support its claim. Despite
the failure of proof, the trial court had entered judgment for the state
on the basis of the importance of common rights of navigation and
fishery in tide-flowed waterways. While Judge Furman found no
evidence in the record of these activities on the creek, he rejected
activity as a proper criterion for riparian designation. Rather, the law
concerning riparian claims of state ownership is the same, whether it
be applied to claims involving tidal marshes or claims concerning tidal
waterways. Id. at 582-83, 442 A.2d at 1055.

962

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:942

It is important to note that this case does not represent a challenge to the use of the mapping technique approved in the Newark
decision. Rather, it focused on the foundation which must be laid in
order for the maps to have probative value. As the year draws to a
close in which the state must comply with the public mandate to map
its riparian claims, the instructive value of this case cannot be underestimated. In anticipation of future tideland litigation arising from
the mapping now in progress, Judge Furman's opinion stands as a
warning to the state that mapping alone, unsubstantiated by expert
interpretation of the mapping data, will not sustain a riparian claim.
A.E.A.

